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We argue that the quality of institutions that enforce contracts and protect property rights 
influences the costs of producing high-value added (complex) versus low-value added (simple) 
products. Since data is hardly available for domestic transactions, we generate predictions about 
the relationship between the quality of institutions and product composition with an international 
trade model and use a rich international trade data set for empirical tests.  We find that 
improvements in institutional quality increase the share and volume of a country's complex 
product exports. However, the initial quality of institutions is important, since in countries with 
the least developed institutions, the share of complex products in exports is generally small and, 
institutional reform has almost no influence on simple product exports. These findings cast 
doubts on the efficacy of institutional reform in countries with underdeveloped institutions. 
 
 
*Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL, 60208-2013, 
j-moenius@kellogg.northwestern.edu.,  
**Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, 15260, 
dmberk+@pitt.edu, 
We are grateful to seminar participants at the EIIT, Notre Dame University, Syracuse University 




Intuitively, we would expect that the quality of institutions that protect property rights 
and enforce contracts should matter for firm-level-production choice. When these institutions are 
bad, producers expect that input suppliers will breach contracts (or that such contracts are 
meaningless and should not even be drawn up) and that buyers and predators can easily steal 
their shipments. When these institutions are good, however, producers are more confident that 
detailed contracts for products that involve multiple suppliers of highly differentiated products 
will be enforced and that stealing will be deterred.  Thus, when institutions are bad, producers 
tend to vertically integrate their production processes and are forced to produce simple products 
that can be produced in-house. When institutions are good, producers tend to outsource using 
multiple input suppliers and can produce, relatively cheaply, high value-added differentiated 
products.  Consequently, we ask the following questions: How does the quality of institutions 
influence the composition of production within a country? And, does this vary by the level of 
development?  
Since transaction data within countries is hard to obtain, we use a rich international trade 
data set to understand the relationship between quality of institutions and production structure.  
We therefore analyze how institutions influence both a country’s comparative advantage in 
complex versus simple products and its international transaction costs. We build on a Ricardian 
model developed in Berkowitz, Moenius and Pistor (2003) that draws a distinction between the 
influence of institutions on comparative advantage and on international transaction costs.  The 
quality of institutions affects the international transaction costs of both exporters and importers: 
Exporters face the risk of not getting paid, but this risk can typically be offset by contractual 
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methods such as letters of credit1 or even pre-payment agreements. Importers, however, are at 
risk of losing a share of their order when it is crossing its border because of predation, piracy and 
corruption. As noted by Anderson and Marcouiller (2001), this risk is lower the more effective 
are the institutions in the importer’s country in protecting property rights and enforcing contracts. 
Thus, when an importer’s institutions improve, its border predation risk is lower and its 
international transaction costs fall. Importers also are at risk of receiving a substandard product. 
This risk is particularly problematic in the case of complex products because they have more 
characteristics that require verification than simple products. Better institutions in the exporter's 
country increase the probability that the importer can be compensated in the event of breach of 
contract, and therefore also increase the exporter’s incentive to make a good faith effort to fulfill 
its contract with the importer. Hence, an improvement in an exporter’s institutions lowers the 
international transaction costs that might have to be borne by its importers because it lowers that 
importer’s potential losses should she receive a substandard product. 
Institutions also influence a country's comparative advantage in complex products. 
Because complex products typically have more production stages, they tend to require more 
outsourcing and contractual relationships and therefore depend more on legal institutions than 
simple products. Thus, a country that has bad institutions tends to be at a comparative 
disadvantage in producing complex products. In what is perhaps an abuse of technical language, 
we will call this national transaction cost effect a production cost effect, since it is 
observationally equivalent to relative efficiency in the production of complex versus simple 
goods. 
The Ricardian model delivers three predictions about the impact of institutional reform of 
interest to us: First, because a country reaps a gain in both comparative advantage and a lowering 
                                                 
1 See Ronald Mann (2000) for a detailed analysis of how exporters and banks ensure payment with letters of credit. 
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of its international transaction cost following an institutional reform, it will increase its volume 
of complex product goods exports. Second, it also shifts export volumes from simple to complex 
products. Finally, the reduction in international transaction costs allows it to export a wider 
variety of complex products. We will refer to the first effect as the volume effect of institutions, 
and to the latter two as the compositional effect of institutions.  
We estimate various specifications implied by the model to learn about the relative 
strength of those two effects for countries with bad versus good institutions. For herein, we refer 
to countries with bad (good) institutions as under-developed (developed).2  We find both volume 
effects and compositional effects to be present whether institutions are good or bad.  However, 
the volume effects for complex products are considerably smaller for countries with bad 
institutions. We also find no measurable effect of institutional reform on simple product exports, 
which represent a large share of developing countries' exports overall. This suggests that the 
efficacy of institutions based development strategies depends on the initial quality of institutions 
– there likely is no "one size fits all". Combining our empirical results with the predictions of the 
model suggests that institutional reform in countries with bad institutions is effective largely 
because it lowers international transaction costs, while it is effective in the more developed 
countries because of its influence on comparative advantage. 
There is currently a small but growing literature analyzing the impact of institutions on 
international trade. Anderson and Marcoulier (2001) conduct theoretical and empirical work 
showing how bad institutions in the importer’s country can deter trade. Berkowitz, Moenius and 
Pistor (2003) show that the institutions in the exporters’ country and importers’ country have 
similar effects on transaction costs, but opposite effects on comparative advantage in simple and 
                                                 
2 GDP per capita is typically used to distinguish between under-developed and developed economies. However, 
Acemoglu et al (2001) show that the quality of institutions has a strong causal effect on cross-country GDP per 
capita. 
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complex products. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2001) show how good financial institutions enable a 
country to be open to international trade; Subramanian, Rodrik and Trebbi (2002) show that 
institutions in fact cause trade; recent work by Rauch (1999) and Casella and Rauch (2003) 
highlights the role of informal networks. We add to this literature in two ways: (1) we offer an 
explanation of the precise mechanism how institutions affects export composition (2) we show 
how initial institutional quality is important for the effectiveness of institutional reform. 
In the next section of this paper we provide a description of the Ricardian model of 
institutions and trade; we then provide a description of the data and estimation; the fourth section 
provides a summary of results; and section five concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
2.1 Institutions and international transaction costs 
Anderson (2001) argues that crossing an international border imposes substantial costs 
because it generally is the location where formal taxes are imposed and where informal groups 
extort bribes. Drawing on this idea, Anderson and Marcouiller (2001), for herein denoted A&M, 
show how high quality importer institutions can limit the expected gains from piracy and bribes 
and thereby reduce transaction costs. A&M assume that costs imposed by predators do not 
depend upon product complexity. Incorporating their results in a reduced form, define s(Iimp) as 
the expected share of goods that survives predation, where Iimp is the quality of importer legal 
institutions, and )1,0[∈s is increasing in Iimp. Let )(⋅τ denote the expected share of an order that 
survives for standard reasons including distance, differences in trading blocs, etc (see Rauch 
(1999)). Let r( ⋅ ) denote the expected share of an order that an importer believes will comply 
with her specifications (after netting out losses from piracy and other transaction costs). Then 
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]1,0[)()()(),( ∈⋅⋅=⋅ τϕ impimp IsrI  is the overall share of products that survives and is received 
by the importer, and ),(1 ⋅− impIϕ denotes international transaction costs. 
Berkowitz, Moenius and Pistor (2003), for herein denoted BMP, derive the properties of 
r, where 
]))(1()())[(1()()( ψππδδ ⋅−−⋅⋅−+⋅=⋅r    (1) 
)(⋅δ is the probability that the importer is satisfied with the shipment, )(⋅π is the probability 
that the importer is compensated if there is a breach of contract, and ψ denotes legal costs 
(normalized as the share of the importer’s costs of the overall shipment) the importer must pay if 
she decides to take the exporter to court for breach of contract.  
Consider first how institutions impact the importer’s transaction costs. In a trading 
relation, the importer is at risk of receiving an inadequate shipment. If the exporter does not fulfil 
the terms of the contract and the importer decides to take the exporter to court, the importer 
typically must make an advance payment to the court or arbitration tribunal to start the process. 
If the court or arbitration tribunal rules against the importer, the importer foregoes her advance 
payment; if the importer wins, then she is reimbursed her pre-payment and is fully compensated 
for the value of shipment. Then )(⋅π is the importer’s expected gain from taking legal action 
when she wins, ψπ ))(1( ⋅−− is the importer’s expected loss if she loses. Therefore, at the time 
of the order, the importer’s expected compensation (as a share of the initial order) if there is a 
breach of contract is ]))(1()())[(1( ψππδ ⋅−−⋅⋅−  and )( ⋅δ  otherwise. 
The exporter has a greater incentive to make a good faith effort when he believes the 
probability he will be punished for breach of contract is high. A good faith effort from the 
exporter, in turn, increases the probability that the importer is satisfied. As complexity of an 
order increases, it becomes more difficult to specify every detail and it becomes more likely that 
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the importer will be dissatisfied even when the exporter makes a good faith effort. Therefore, the 
probability that the importer is satisfied with the shipment, ),(⋅δ depends upon 
enforcement, )(⋅π , and product complexity, c. In summary,  
)1,0[,0/,0/:),( ∈<∂∂>∂∂= πδδπδπδδ forcc     (2)   
Regarding the role of institutions as a determinant of enforcement, our basic premise is 
that the institutions in the exporter’s country are critical. If there is a breach of contract and the 
importer takes the exporter to court, then the case can be solved in courts in the importer’s 
country, the exporter’s country, or in a third country by court or arbitration tribunal. However, 
because exporters generally hold the bulk of their immobile assets in their home country and 
because only the domestic courts can seize these assets in peacetime, then legal institutions 
(courts and their complementary enforcement agencies) in the exporter’s country are the last 
resort for solving the exporter’s disputes with the importer no matter where the hearing is held.  
Product complexity also determines the probability of enforcement. Complex products, 
such as custom-made machines or even mass-produced machines, contain many characteristics. 
These characteristics are numerous, often subjective (as in the case of user-friendliness of a 
particular machine) and highly differentiated across otherwise similar products.  As the number 
and subjectivity of these characteristics increases, product complexity increases and it becomes 
more difficult for the court to verify whether the character of the exporter’s shipment fulfills the 
letter and spirit of the contract. Thus, the probability of enforcement is decreasing in product 
complexity. Summarizing the discussion, then  
)1,0[0/,0/:),( expexp ∈<∂∂>∂∂= πππππ forcIcI   (3) 
where Iexp denotes the quality of exporter institutions. 
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into (1) and differentiating, then 
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0))1()1(*/(/*)1(/ expexp >−+−∂∂∂∂+=∂∂ δππδπψ IIr  (4) 
0)/)1()//*/)(1()[1(/ <∂∂−+∂∂+∂∂∂∂−+=∂∂ ccccr πδδππδπψ  (5) 
 Equations (4) and (5) summarize the impact of exporter institutions and product 
complexity on international transaction costs.3 An improvement in institutions in the exporter 
country causes π to increase, which then raises the probability that the exporter makes a good 
faith effort. This raises the probability that the importer is satisfied, and that the importer is 
compensated if there is a breach of contract, which then leads to an increase in r (a decrease in 
international transaction costs). An increase in product complexity directly lowers the probability 
that the importer is satisfied, and also lowers the probability that the importer is compensated if 
there is a breach of contract. This provides an exporter with a greater incentive to shirk, and 
consequently lowers the probability that the importer is satisfied. Thus, overall, an increase in 
product complexity lowers r.  Third, better institutions in the exporter country dampen the 
marginal negative impact of complexity on r: 0/ exp2 >∂∂∂ cIr . Finally, the share of 
surviving products, )1,0[)()(),(),,,( expexp ∈⋅⋅⋅=⋅ τϕ impimp IsIcrIIc , has all three of these 
properties established and, following A&M, is increasing in the quality of institutions in the 
importer’s country. That is, an improvement in importer institutions lowers international 
transaction costs because it reduces predation at the importer’s border. 
  
2.2 Institutions and Comparative Advantage 
 In order to generate predictions about the impact of institutions on trade, we incorporate 
international transaction and domestic production costs into a general equilibrium model based 
                                                 
3 Importer institutions, as previously noted, also are important because of their impact on predation at the importer’s 
border. Importer institutions influence overall transaction costs, but do not influence r, the share of an order that the 
importer expects to comply with the contract. 
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upon the Ricardian model of  Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (1977).  There are two countries 
(home and foreign); two simple products denoted S and S* that can be produced only by the 
home and foreign country, and a continuum of equally complex products distributed on 
]1,0[∈z . The labor and institutional endowments in the home and foreign country are (L, I) and 
(L*,I*).  Because competitive outsourcing of parts production on the domestic market requires 
low domestic transaction costs, high transaction costs enforce potentially inefficient in-house 
production. Therefore, this is denoted the production cost effect of legal institutions. Good 
domestic institutions discourage predators and also offset domestic suppliers’ incentive to shirk. 
Because the cost of predation does not depend upon product complexity, while shirking is more 
lucrative for complex products, an improvement in domestic institutions lowers production costs 
of complex relative to simple products and, thereby, increases a country’s comparative advantage 
in complex products. To capture this, we assume that producing either simple product requires 
one labor unit. Furthermore, let a(z)/I and a*(z)/I* denote production (unit labor costs) for 
complex product  z in the domestic and foreign country. Thus, better domestic institutions lower 
the relative production cost of complex products. 
Complex products are sorted by comparative advantage and the home country has a 









The representative agents in each country have the same utility function 
 dzzxSSzxSSU )(lnln)*ln()1())(*,,( 10∫++−= ββ
ρρ    (7) 
where )1,0(}1,{ ∈−ββ  are shares of income spent on simple and complex products, 
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),/1(1 σρ −= σ is the elasticity of substitution within simple products, and the elasticity of 
substitution across complex products is one. It is assumed that S and S* are relatively closer 
substitutes than complex products: 
 1>σ        (8) 
Thus, in complex product markets consumers buy the entire continuum and spend the same 
amount of money on each product. However, in simple product markets consumers spend less on 
S and more on S* as the price of S relative to S* increases. 
Solving under the standard assumption of full employment, labor-immobility and two-
way trade in both product categories, the impact of exporter and importer institutions on trade in 
simple and complex products can be decomposed into their respective production and 
international transaction costs effects. Consider first complex products. Following an 
improvement in exporter institutions, the importer country's comparative advantage in complex 
products falls because the exporter can manufacture complex products relatively more cheaply. 
Furthermore, transaction costs also fall because the importer country’s risk of receiving shoddy 
complex products from an exporter with better institutions is lower. Thus, by both the production 
and transaction cost effects complex imports increase. Following an improvement in domestic 
institutions, the importer country's comparative advantage in complex products increases, and its 
transaction cost fall because better domestic institutions lower its predation risk at its border. 
Thus, complex goods imports decrease by the production cost effect, but increase by the 
international transaction cost effect, and the overall impact of an improvement in importer 
institutions is ambiguous. Furthermore, the overall effect of importer institutions on complex 
product imports is negative if and only if their production cost effect dominates their trade cost 
effect.  Letting Mcomplex , Iimp and Iexp denote  the equilibrium quantity of complex imports, 
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importer and exporter institutions, then the import elasticity of complex products with respect to 





































Because a gain in comparative advantage in the complex goods sector implies growing 
comparative disadvantage in the simple sector, the production cost effects of exporter and 
importer institutions for simple products have the opposite sign in their impact on complex 
product markets. The effect of legal institutions on transaction costs is ambiguous in simple 
product markets.  However, under general conditions (available upon request), the overall effect 
of importer institutions on simple product imports is positive, while the overall effect of exporter 
institutions is ambiguous.  
Similar to results derived in other Ricardian models (see Dornbusch et al, 1997; Flam and 
Helpman, 1987) the model also predicts that the percentage fall in complex imports following a 
one-percent increase in the quality of its own institutions is entirely offset by the percentage 
increase in complex goods imports following a one-percent increase in the quality of exporter 










   (11) 
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Combining equations (9)-(11), then the model predicts that the overall elasticity of 
complex trade with respect to institutions equals the pure impact of institutions on complex trade 















  (12)4 
This pure transactions costs effect is strictly positive for two reasons: an improvement in 
domestic institutions makes importing complex products (as well as simple products) cheaper 
because it lowers the extent of predation at the domestic border; and, an improvement in 
institutions in some foreign country also lowers the cost of importing complex products because 
it lowers the home country’s risk of importing shoddy complex products from this foreign 
country.   
The model does not make sharp predictions about how this pure international transactions 
cost effect depends upon the level of development; nor does it make sharp predictions about the 
levels of development at which the transactions cost effect or comparative advantage dominate. 
Clearly, the less-developed economies are more flexible in adjusting their production structure 
than developed economies. Therefore, one might suspect that the comparative advantage effect 
should dominate in less-developed countries. However, the international trade cost effect will 
already benefit existing trading relationships, while the comparative advantage effect requires 
setting up new trading relations. Setting up these new relations requires a stock of substantial 
trust that, arguably, is relatively scarce in less-developed economies. For these reasons (which 
are outside of our model), comparative advantage effects should be stronger in developed 
                                                 
4 A similar result holds for trade in simple products, but it is not important for the empirical work that follows. 
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economies. Just which effect dominates in the less developed and the developed economies is, 
then, an empirical question and will be resolved in the next sections. 
3. Estimation 
3.1  Data 
In order to test the predictions of this model, we collected data from the following 
sources. The national accounts data is taken from the IMF Financial Statistical Yearbook, and the 
gravity controls are the same as in Rauch (1999). We use the 1990 values throughout.5 Data on 
the quality of institutions comes from the International Country Risk Guide, where the quality of 
institutions is measured using the survey data approach advocated by Knack and Keefer (1994) 
and Kaufmann et al (1999). This data is constructed as an annual index from a simple average of 
quality ratings of institutions by country. Each rating ranges from one to ten with ten 
representing the highest quality. For our purposes, we include in these ratings an average of 
indices of the rule of law, expropriation risk, corruption in government, and bureaucratic 
quality.6 We do not include repudiation of government contracts and ethnic tensions, since those 
dimensions do not fit the concept of legal quality we introduced.7 Consistent with our model in 
which institutions are exogenous and GDP per capita is endogenous, we use the quality of these 
institutions as the metric of development, and define the most underdeveloped countries as the 
countries in the bottom quartile on this dimension of our sample. Summary statistics for the 
average index number we used in the estimation are provided in Table 1a. Trade data is obtained 
from the World Trade Database compiled by Statistics Canada. To categorize the products into 
                                                 
5 This only poses a problem for the language variable, since in some countries with large immigration activities, 
these numbers may not be constant. However, we think the variations are generally small enough to not change the 
results in any significant way. 
6 Source is the International Country Risk Guide used by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Kaufmann (1999). We 
thank Stephen Knack for providing this data. All six of the indices are highly correlated and could also be 
aggregated using principal components. 
7 However, it should be noted that all results are robust with the inclusion of these two dimensions. 
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different degrees of complexity, we employ the classification developed by Rauch (1999). Since 
complexity cannot be determined directly, he sorts four digit SITC industries into trading 
categories: those goods that are predominantly traded on organized exchanges (metals, pork), 
those that are reference priced (chemicals, fertilizers) and those that neither have reference prices 
nor are traded on organized exchanges (e.g., shoes, cars and machinery). We reinterpret this 
classification in terms of product complexity, where “organized exchange” denotes low 
complexity (simple) and “neither” captures high complexity.8 In Table 1b, we report summary 
statistics of the relative importance of simple versus complex products. There are 55 countries 
(see Table 1c) in the data set, and all variables are either fixed or reported on an annual basis 
from 1982 to 1992.  
 
3.2  Estimation 
As Eaton and Kortum (2002) have shown, the Ricardian Model of Dornbusch et al. 
(1977) in a multi-country setting leads to a gravity specification of bilateral trade-flows. Our set-
up differs from theirs in two important aspects. First, we differentiate by the types of goods, 
since we introduce both a simple and a complex products sector. We assume that each national 
economy is fully described by these two sectors: only the complex goods sector is identical to the 
Dornbusch et al. (1977) specification. Second, we utilize a mechanism that influences both 
domestic production and international transaction costs.9 We therefore estimate the empirical 
model: 
ijtkjtkitkijtkjiijtk IIXIM εδγβαα +++++=    (13) 
                                                 
8  All results for “reference priced”, which one might interpret as mid-complexity, are generally consistent with the 
model we present and are available upon request. 
9 These two differences require changes in the estimation equation relative to theirs, as well as in the interpretation 
of the coefficients, since changes in the quality of legal institutions cannot be interpreted as being similar to a 
national technology effect. 
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where IMijtk  denotes the dollar value of imports originating from country j and shipped to 
country i in year t and industry group k, where k can only assume two values: complex or simple. 
Similarly, Xijt contains the standard gravity variables including GDP and GDP per capita for each 
country10, distance between the two countries, and whether or not the countries share a common 
border, have colonial ties, or share languages. The coefficients αi and αj are associated with 
country dummy variables. Whenever a country is part of a bilateral trading relationship, this 
dummy variable assumes a value of 1; the variable is zero otherwise. This guarantees that 
country-specific effects for both exporters and importers, which can be assumed constant over 
our eleven-year period (such as geography and infrastructure in general), are absorbed. Our 
variables of interest are Iit and Ijt, which denote the quality level of exporter and importer legal 
institutions, hereafter referred to simply as institutions.11 To study the effect of institutions at 
different levels of development, we interact the latter two variables with dummy-variables Dqm, 
Dqe that assume the value of one if a country falls into a certain quartile of the quality of legal 
institutions, where m stands for importer and e for exporter, while q is the quartile of 











  (14) 
We also add the Dqm and Dqe dummy-variables separately to our regressions to control for 
potential bias in our results. This will allow us to study the volume effects by level of institutions 
(table 3 in the appendix). In order to learn about the compositional effects, we repeat the exercise 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that GDP and GDP per capita were entered separately in the regression, since the quality of 
legal institutions is highly correlated with GDP per capita (ρ=0.82) 
11 This specification simplifies the Eaton and Kortum (2002) specification because it excludes the effect of changes 
in all other countries’ legal qualities on a particular country-pair’s bilateral imports. This, however, will only cause 
omitted variable bias if there is correlation between the importer’s quality of legal institutions and all other 
countries’ quality of institutions corrected by distance and other impediments to trade. This bias, however, seems 
negligible.  
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in three different ways: we replace imports on the left hand side with net imports, imports of 
complex goods relative to simple goods as well as the counts of industries by category. For 
example, if Germany has positive imports to France in 150 four-digit SITC industries in the 
complex goods sector in a particular year, this variable assumes the value 150. As discussed 
above, this variable allows us to test for the prediction of the DFS-model that a reduction in 
international trade costs should lead to more types of goods within a category traded.  
Finally, a feature of the gravity model regressions, which is problematic for calculating 
standard errors, is that the same country’s characteristics will be represented on the right hand 
side repeatedly. Defining these repetitions as groups, error terms within those groups are likely to 
be correlated with each other, while error terms across groups should not correlate. In order to 
account for this grouping effect, we replace the traditional Huber-White errors (White, 1980) 
with robust standard errors that additionally account for within-group correlation. As a result, our 
standard errors are considerably higher than those normally reported, and this hurts the statistical 
significance of our estimates. However, we include this adjustment in an effort to produce the 
most cautious estimates.  
 
4. Results 
Table 3 columns report results for estimation of the effect of institutions on trade 
volumes. In the first two columns we present results for the effect of exporter and importer 
institutions on complex and simple imports when there is no distinction drawn between countries 
with good and bad institutions. In the case of complex products, all of the predictions of the 
model are confirmed; the impact of exporter institutions is positive and the effect of importer 
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institutions is negative and exporter institutions have the greatest absolute impact.12 The negative 
coefficient on the quality of importer institutions suggests that the production cost effect actually 
dominates the transaction cost effect. In simple product markets, the results are also consistent 
with the predictions derived from the model. The overall effect of importer institutions is 
positive and the effect of exporter institutions is negative. This again suggests that production 
costs dominate transaction costs.  
In columns 3-4, we draw a distinction between the impact of institutions in relatively 
less-developed and developed countries.13 The baseline is an estimate of the impact of legal 
institutions in countries in the lowest institutions quartile; the coefficients for “separate for 
second quartile legal quality countries,” “separate for third quartile legal quality countries,” and 
“separate for fourth quartile legal quality countries,” provides estimates of the incremental 
impact of an improvement of institution in countries in the second, third and fourth legal quality 
quartiles relative to the countries in the lowest quartile.  
The results can be summarized as follows: with the exception of their effect on complex 
goods exports, improvements in the quality of legal institutions do not have any measurable 
effect on trade for the least developed countries. This does not change dramatically in the second 
quartile of development either, so that one could reasonably argue that improvements of the 
quality of legal institutions only have a positive effect on complex goods exports for the lower 
half of the distribution and exhibit rich general equilibrium effects for the upper half of the 
distribution, and all the measurable effects are stronger for the latter group. The robustness-
                                                 
12 These results are identical with the first two columns of table 4 in BMP (2003). 
13 We use the quality of institutions rather than GDP per capita as the metric of development following Acemgolu et 
al (2001), institutions for the most part cause GDP per capita. If, following the World Bank (2001), we were to use 
GDP per capita as the metric of development, our empirical results would be quite similar in pattern but very 
different in magnitude than what we present in this paper. For the theoretical  implications of measuring 
development using GDP per capita on trade, see Murphy and Shleifer, 1997. 
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checks in columns 5 and 6 generally confirm the findings for exporter institutions, while the 
results for importer institutions are weaker. The overall predictions, however, remain unchanged. 
In the context of our model, these results can be interpreted as follows: In the least developed 
countries, an improvement in the quality of legal institutions improves their comparative 
advantage in producing complex products and at the same time reduces their international 
transaction costs. However, this latter effect seems to wash out the production cost effect on the 
importer side: we do not see any effect of importer legal institutions at all. At later stages of 
development, the production cost effect seems to dominate, and we see general equilibrium 
effects in both the complex as well as the simple goods markets.  
Taking our model literally, one could go one step further: we can calculate the overall 
transaction cost effect from both exporter and importer institutions, and we can also calculate the 
range of values for the production cost effect that our estimates support. These calculations are 
shown in table 3a and figure 1: at lower stages of development, legal institutions primarily 
reduce international transactions costs, while at higher stages, they mostly promote comparative 
advantage. While we find this result striking, a few caveats have to be raised: first, we do not 
want to put too much stress on the absolute size of our coefficients,14 but maintain that the 
relative strength of the effects is valid as confirmed by our robustness-checks in consecutive 
tables. Moreover, these calculations are based on our point-estimates, not taking any confidence-
levels into account. Second, the lack of bite of legal institutions for the least developed may 
result from factors outside of our model: this is a general equilibrium model that assumes full 
employment and production at the technological frontier enforced by perfect competition, all of 
                                                 
14 This is especially important to note in the light of the criticism raised by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). 
While the country-dummies in our regression take partially care of their concerns, it does not do so in full, since we 
cannot allow for country-year dummies and still identify our model. However, in our robustness-checks below, we 
introduce a specification that allows for country-pair-year effects, which fully absorbs the issues of their concern, 
and our results are robust to that change in specification. 
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which are very likely violated in developing countries. For example, initial production structures 
and high unemployment may lead to large movements from farm to factory, driving those 
countries closer to their production possibility frontier and thereby increasing complex exports. 
Moreover, asymmetric tariffs and non-tariff measures may prevent institutions to take effect: be 
it import quotas for cars in developing countries or farm subsidies in developed ones.15 
Shifts in comparative advantage by product category should be most easily visible from 
net exports: if our predictions hold, we should see improvements in exporter institutions to be 
directly linked to increases in net exports of complex versus simple products. We estimate this 
claim modifying (14) where we replace the left hand side variable with net exports by country 
and product category. The results can be found in table 3b. Column 1 and 2 state the baseline 
results. Again, our findings are consistent with the model's predictions: not only do complex 
product exports volumes increase following an institutional improvements, they also increase on 
net. Moreover, we find this net effect to be fairly constant across all levels of development. The 
general equilibrium effect, which predicts increases in net imports is only present for the more 
developed economies: less developed countries do not need to fear that they will lose their 
production base in simple products right away by an improvement of the quality of their 
institutions. These results are again confirmed with our robustness-checks in columns 5 and 6.16 
While net-exports account for changes in comparative advantage relative to other 
countries within the same sector, relative exports, that is exports in the complex sector relative to 
the simple sector measure changes in production structure across sectors. We repeat the exercise 
                                                 
15 We are able to control for these factors down to a 2-digit industry level by country-pair and year in our 
robustness-checks in table five. 
16 It should be noted that this regression cannot be as easily derived directly from the original gravity specification as 
the other results in this paper. Consequently, we caution to interpret the absolute size of the coefficients. However, 
as stated before, we are confident about the relative size of coefficients. 
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in equation (14), but now replace the left-hand side variable with relative exports. The effects are 
again in the predicted directions and strongest for higher levels of development. 
The idea that international transaction cost effects may dominate can be tested with an 
additional feature of our model, since it predicts that lowering international transaction costs 
increases the number of complex products imported and exported, while changes in comparative 
advantage result in a shift of the number of products traded in favor of the country that improves 
its institutions relatively more. In table 4, we replace our dependent variable with the number of 
four digit SITC industries that are imported within each category. In column one, we present the 
overall effects for complex products. We again see the same pattern established in table 3: better 
exporter institutions lead to an increase in the number of exported complex products, and, better 
importer institutions lead to a decrease in the number of imported complex products, and the first 
effect dominates. We repeat the exercise by development quartile and confirm the results from 
table 3 again: better institutions increase the number of complex products that a particular 
country exports, and does so at an increasing rate as its institutions improve. It does not import 
goods from fewer industries as the model would predict if it is in the lowest category, if 
anything, it is the opposite. This is consistent with the view that international transaction costs 
effects dominate comparative advantage effects in the lowest development quartile. Without any 
theoretical backup from our model, we repeat the exercise for the simple sector. The striking 
news here is that there seems to be a positive effect on the number of industries that countries 
export when they improve the quality of their legal institutions, despite the fact that they reduce 
the volumes of exports in simple goods, and this effect is roughly equally strong across all 
development quartiles. Moreover, improvements of the quality of importer institutions do not 
seem to decrease the numbers of simple goods industries from which a country imports. While 
 20
our model does not directly predict this result, we think of these results as additional evidence 
that is consistent with the ideas about the relative effects of institutions on international 
transaction costs versus production costs. 
We repeat the empirical exercise from table 3c with the number of industry links. As 
stated before, strictly speaking the model only delivers predictions for the complex sector. 
However, from an empirical point of view it is interesting at which stage of development the 
compositional change of industries resulting from a change in institutional quality is the 
strongest. The results are as follows: The higher the exporter's quality of institutions, the more 
complex goods – relative to simple goods – industries a country imports from. The higher the 
importer country's quality of institutions, the more simple goods industries – relative to complex 
goods – a country will import from a trading partner. This implies again that comparative 
advantage effects are strong. And again, as column 2 reveals, they are stronger again for the 
more developed economies. 
If our results are correct, then two final predictions from our model can be taken to the 
data. First, the role of institutions should be more important with increasing complexity of 
products. Second, the comparative advantage effect of institutions should be stronger for larger 
countries, since those have more opportunity to outsource within its own borders. Since the 
former prediction cannot be achieved within the scope of equation (14), we amend (14) in a way 
that allows us to exploit the full information that is available to us in our dataset, and which also 
allows us to check the validity of our argument and the robustness of our results We replace our 
dependent variable with the four-digit SITC import-flows and interact our legal variables with 
dummy-variables for complex products by development, where, for tractability, we analyze only 
below and above median quality of institutions (development).We therefore introduce the 
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following dummy variables. The dummy variable for complex goods, DC, assumes a value of 1 
whenever an industry on the left hand side of our regression falls into the complex goods 
category and zero otherwise. The dummy variable for above median quality of institutions, Dqm 
for the importer and Dqe for the exporter, assume a value of one whenever the importer or 
exporter, respectively, are located in a country whose institutions are above the median quality 
level and zero otherwise. Our basic regression equation changes to: 
ijtkjtqeCqkjtCkitqmCqkitCkjtiCijtijtk IDDIDIDDIDXDFIM εδδγγβ +⋅⋅+⋅+⋅⋅+⋅+⋅+= ,  
With this procedure, we are no longer able to distinguish the effects of legal institutions 
separately for complex versus simple products; all we can do is identify the relative effect. In all 
cases, we also include per capita GDP separately for complex goods as well as all relevant direct 
effects as represented by Xi,jt. Additional interaction terms are added to this equation to study the 
two predictions stated above. All results are presented in a two step fashion: First, we present the 
overall results, controlling for GDP per capita, direct effects as well as all country-pair specific 
effects that vary over time; for example factor endowments, country-specific technology levels, 
exchange rates and country-pair specific transport costs. Second, we present the results by level 
of development, where we distinguish only two categories: above or below the median level of 
development. In the second set of regressions we also replace the country-pair-year fixed effects 
with country-pair-year-two-digit industry effects to control for additional price effects on the 
industry level. The results with the country-pair year effects are quite similar and are available 
from the authors on request. The results are presented in table 5. In column one, we estimate the 
direct effects of the quality of legal institutions on complex relative to simple goods imports. The 
results reconfirm our previous findings: exporter institutions have a positive effect on complex 
relative to simple exports, and this effect is the stronger when institutions are developed. On the 
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other hand, importer institutions have a negative effect on complex relative to simple goods 
imports, and, consistent with previous results, this effect is increasing in the development level.  
As stated before, if our argument is correct, we should see the results to be stronger for 
"more complex" goods. We employ SITC-one-digit codes as a proxy for complexity (increasing 
SITC-codes are associated with increases in complexity). We interact this variable with our 
institutional quality variables. The results of these regressions are presented in column three and 
four of table five. We find a positive interaction effect overall as well as at both levels of 
development for exporter institutions, and this effect seems to drive most of the increase of the 
effect of legal institutions in the more developed countries. For importer institutions, we see a 
negative interaction effect, which is, however, smaller for higher levels of development.17 
Finally, good institutions should benefit larger countries more than smaller countries, 
since they should be able to outsource more internally than smaller countries. We test this 
hypothesis by interacting our legal variables with the log of GDP for complex goods. The results 
are presented in column five and six. Despite the fact that the coefficient on the exporter-
institutions variable is negative, the overall effect is positive even if the effect is evaluated on the 
minimum value of the log of GDP, both for the overall effect as well as the effect by level of 
development. The interaction effect for importer institutions is not as clear-cut: The overall effect 
is positive, while slightly negative when we distinguish different levels of development.  
Overall, the findings are consistent both with our model as well as economic intuition and 
are robust to various changes in specification. The quality of legal institutions seems to exert 
strong effects on the trade of large developed countries, while smaller, less developed countries 
may not be able to draw as much from the benefits as one might hope.  
                                                 
17 In this regression, we were only able to control for country-pair-year effects, since we would not know how to 
interpret the coefficient on interaction terms if we controlled for variations at the two-digit level while we 




In this paper we argued that domestic production structure is reflected in a country's 
international production trade structure. In the absence of trade restrictions, a country's 
internationally competitive sectors will export and its less competitive sectors will import from 
other countries. Consequently, the mechanism of change in the production structure of 
developing economies from improvements in institutions can be uncovered through international 
trade flows. We argue that institutions lower both domestic as well as international transaction 
costs. Consequently improvements in the quality of institutions could help the less developed 
economies (and economies at all levels of development) shift into a more complex-intensive 
export structure by a national transaction cost effect, which influences comparative advantage, 
and an international trade cost effect. Our empirical findings support this finding; however, our 
results also show that, in terms of volumes, the less developed economies benefit less from 





Acemoglu, Daron , Simon Johnson and A. James Robinson, 2001. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 91(5): 1369-1401. 
Anderson, James. 2001. Trade and Informal Institutions. Boston University (mimeo) (November). 
Anderson, James, and Eric Van Wincoop, 2003. “Gravity with Gravitas: a Solution to the Border Puzzle”, 
American Economic Review, 93(1): 170-92 
Anderson, James, and Douglas Marcouiller. 2001. "Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical 
Investigation." Review of Economics and Statistics, 84 (2): 345-52. 
Berkowitz, Daniel, Johannes Moenius and Katharina Pistor, 2003. "Trade, Law and Product Complexity." 
Mimeo and Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 230 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=315969. 
Dornbusch, Rudiger, Stanley Fisher, and Paul A. Samuelson,. 1977. "Comparative Advantage,  
Trade, and Payments in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods.”  American Economic 
Review, 67: 823-39. 
Eaton, Jonathan, and Samuel Kortum. 2002. "Technology, Geography and Trade.”   
Econometrica, 70(5): 1741-1779. 
Flam, Harry and Elphanan Helpman. 1987. “Vertical Product Differentiation and North  
South Trade.” American Economic Review 77: 810-822. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. Aggregating Governance Indicators. 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1997. "Legal 
Determinants of External Finance." Journal of Finance LII (3): 1131-1150. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1998. "Law and 
Finance." Journal of Political Economy 106 (6): 1113-1155. 
Mann, Ronald. 2000. "The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions." University of Michigan 
Law Review 98(8): 2494-2536. 
Murphy, Kevin and Andrei Shleifer. 1997. “Quality and Trade.” Journal of Development  
Economics 53: 1-15. 
Rauch, James E. 1999. "Networks Versus Markets in International Trade." Journal of International 
Economics 48(1): 7-35. 
Subramanian, Arvind, Dani Rodrik and Francesco Trebbi. 2002. "Institutions Rule. The Primacy of 
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development." October. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Svaleryd, Helena and Janos Vlachos. 2001. “Financial Markets, the Pattern of Specialization  
and Comparative Advantage.” Chapter 2 in Jonas Vlachos, Risk Matters: Studies in Finance, 
Trade and Politics. Doctoral Dissertation, Stockholm School of Economics, EFI, the Economics 
Research Institute. 
White, Halbert L. 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a  
Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity." Econometrica 48: 817-838. 
World Bank. 2001. “World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets.”  




Table 1a: Summary Statistics Quality of Legal Institutions 
 
 Statistics Value  (Index Number) 
Countries close to 
value 
Average 4.59 Brazil, Chile, Malaysia 
Min 1 Iran, Bolivia, Indonesia, Nigeria 
Max 7 Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark 
Overall 
(year = 1990) 















( From Berkowitz et. al 2003) 
 
Table 1b: Complexity Intensiveness of Exports*  
 
 Statistics Value Countries close to value 
Average 10.7 France, Ireland, Spain 
Min 0.02 Iran, Nigeria, Saudi-Arabia 
Max 165 Japan, Hong Kong, Switzerland 
Overall  
(year = 1990) 















( From Berkowitz et. al 2003) 
 
*Ratio (using US dollar values) of Complex Products to Simple Product Exports 
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Table 2a: Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of 
Export Volumes (in $ 1,000), 1990 






















































































Table 2b: Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of 
Industry Trading Relations*, 1990 





















































































* This is the number of industries that a country exports in to a particular other country
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Table 2c: List of countries 
 
Argentina Ecuador  Indonesia  New Zealand  South Africa  
Australia  Egypt  Iran  Nigeria  Spain  
Austria  Ethiopia  Ireland  Norway  Sudan  
Bel-Lux  Finland  Italy  Pakistan  Sweden  
Bolivia  France  Japan  Paraguay  Switzerland  
Brazil  Germany, FR  Kenya  Peru  Thailand  
Canada  Ghana  Korea, 
Republic  
Philippines  Turkey  
Chile  Greece  Malaysia  Poland  United 
Kingdom  
China  Hong Kong  Mexico  Portugal  United States  
Colombia  Hungary  Morocco  Saudi Arabia  Uruguay  





Table 3: Import Regressions (Dollar Values) 
Pooled for 1982-1992, Complex vs. Simple Goods 
 
Regression 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple 
























































































Quality of importer institutions  













-  separate for second quartile 









-  separate for third quartile 









-  separate for fourth quartile 









Quality of exporter institutions  













-  separate for second quartile 









-  separate for third quartile 









-  separate for fourth quartile 









Country-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quartile dummies*     Yes Yes 
Number of Clusters 2755 2550 2755 2550 2755 2550 
adjusted R2 0.79 0.50 0.80 0.51 0.80 0.51 
Observations 22,669 18,948 22,669 18,948 22,669 18,948 
 
T-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors that account for 
within-group correlation. Clusters are around country-pairs. * There are six additional dummies 
for the level of development by importing and exporting country corresponding to the additional 
quartile-coefficients in columns 3-6 
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Table 3a: Predicted effect on Production and Transaction Costs based on the 
Model for Complex Goods 
 
 
Income Quartile Total Transaction Costs Bounds for Production Costs (PC) 
Overall 0.34 0.85 > PC > 0.51 
Low 0.46 0.51 > PC > 0.05 
Mid-Low 0.42 0.62 > PC > 0.20 
Mid-High 0.35 0.74 > PC > 0.39 
High 0.27 0.68 > PC > 0.41 
 
 
Transaction vs. Production Cost Effect by Quartile

















Table 3b: Net-Export Regressions (Dollar Values) 
Pooled for 1982-1992, Complex vs. Simple Goods 
 
Regression 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple 
























































































Quality of importer institutions  













-  separate for second quartile 









-  separate for third quartile 









-  separate for fourth quartile 









Quality of exporter institutions  













-  separate for second quartile 









-  separate for third quartile 









-  separate for fourth quartile 









Country-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quartile dummies*     Yes Yes 
Number of Clusters 1993 1960 1993 1960 1993 1960 
adjusted R2 0.74 0.52 0.74 0.52 0.74 0.52 
Observations 12,096 10,853 12,096 10,853 12,096 10,853 
 
T-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors that account for 
within-group correlation. Clusters are around country-pairs. * There are six additional dummies 
for the level of development by importing and exporting country corresponding to the additional 
quartile-coefficients in columns 3-6 
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Table 3c: Relative-Export Regressions (Dollar Values) 
Pooled for 1982-1992, Complex vs. Simple Goods 
 
Regression 
Column 1 2 3 













































Quality of importer institutions 







-  separate for second quartile 





-  separate for third quartile 





-  separate for fourth quartile 





Quality of exporter institutions 







-  separate for second quartile 





-  separate for third quartile 





-  separate for fourth quartile 





Country-dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Quartile dummies*   Yes 
Number of Clusters 2492 2492 2492 
adjusted R2 0.37 0.39 0.39 
Observations 18,393 18,393 18,393 
 
T-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors that account for 
within-group correlation. Clusters are around country-pairs. * There are six additional dummies 
for the level of development by importing and exporting country corresponding to the additional 
quartile-coefficients in columns 3-6 
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Table 4: Import Regressions (Industry Links)  
Pooled for 1982-1992, Complex vs. Simple Goods 
 
Regression 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple 
























































































Quality of importer institutions  














-  separate for second quartile 









-  separate for second quartile 









-  separate for second quartile 









Quality of exporter institutions  














-  separate for second quartile 









-  separate for second quartile 









-  separate for second quartile 









Country-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quartile dummies*     Yes Yes 
Number of Clusters 2755 2550 2755 2550 2755 2550 
R2 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.74 
Observations 22,669 18,948 22,669 18,948 22,669 18,948 
 
T-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors that account for 




Table 4c: Relative-Export Regressions (Industry Links) 
Pooled for 1982-1992, Complex vs. Simple Goods 
 
Regression 
Column 1 2 3 













































Quality of importer institutions 







-  separate for second quartile 





-  separate for third quartile 





-  separate for fourth quartile 





Quality of exporter institutions 







-  separate for second quartile 





-  separate for third quartile 





-  separate for fourth quartile 





Country-dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Quartile dummies*   Yes 
Number of Clusters 2492 2492 2492 
adjusted R2 0.36 0.37 0.39 
Observations 18,393 18,393 18,393 
 
T-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors that account for 
within-group correlation. Clusters are around country-pairs. * There are six additional dummies 
for the level of development by importing and exporting country corresponding to the additional 
quartile-coefficients in columns 3-6 
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Table 5: Import Regressions (Dollar Values) 
Pooled for 1982-1992, Complex Relative to Simple Goods 
 
 
T-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors that account for 
within-group correlation. Clusters are around the dummy variables in the control sets.  
Regression 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 











Quality of importer institutions  


















Interaction Effect  









-  separate for above median    0.06 (20.07)  
0.03 
(2.21) 
Quality of exporter institutions  


















Interaction Effect  









-  separate for above median    0.07 (23.21)  
-0.03 
(-2.15) 
Controls:       











DCG x DH1  







DCG x DH2 







































SITC One-digit-industry code    0.01 (3.31) 
0.04 
(11.87)   
Country-pair-year dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Country-pair-year-2digit SITC dummies  Yes    Yes 
Number of Clusters 24,470 775,652 24,470 24,470 24,470 775,652 
adjusted R2 0.41 0.60 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.60 
Observations 2,991,088 2,991,088 2,991,088 2,991,088 2,991,088 2,991,088 
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